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Abstract: This paper takes a recently published text and, in examining it closely, argues 
that it exemplifies trends within feminist scholarship in law, which might be characterised 
as establishing a form of orthodoxy. The paper explores some of the ways in which this 
orthodoxy is constructed and presented, and argues that it is characterised by a commitment 
both to ‘grand theory’ and Hegelian dialectics. The adoption of this model of work seems 
to offer a chance to hold together the triangular figure of women/theory/law reform. The 
paper will argue that, whilst this model is clearly a valid choice, and attractive to feminist 
scholars in the promise it seems to hold, the model is not to be presumed but rather should 
be examined and considered in terms of its potential for feminist scholarship. Both within 
its own terms, and as part of the construction of an orthodoxy, the paper will argue that 
it is in fact problematic and that feminist scholarship would be better served by seeking 
an alternative theoretical model. An alternative is suggested, using the work of Deleuze, 
but it is acknowledged that this will require the acceptance of a very different theoretical 
configuration from that suggested by the triangular model of women/theory/law reform. 
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Feminist scholarship in law has become a well-established presence in the 
academy. In the decade since this journal was established, we have seen a 
proliferation of texts (including the Feminist Perspectives on Law series 
published by Cavendish), journal papers, seminars, and courses which 
evidence that presence. Indeed, whereas one of our purposes in setting 
up this journal was to make sure that feminist material had a place for 
publication, we now find much feminist material being published in other 
journals, although there is still some difficulty, I think, in placing material 
in the more ‘prestigious’ mainstream law journals rather than in those 
journals dedicated to socio-legal or critical legal studies. As it becomes 
easier for feminist work to be published elsewhere, there is a subtle shift in 
the ways in which a specifically feminist law journal can be used. Principally, 
I think, it is now important that we more consciously use this 
space, to pursue difficult and complex debates within feminist scholarship, 
in particular with regard to the presentation of a more rigorous and selfreflective 
engagement with law and theory. It is, perhaps, in the nature 
of the development of new areas of work that for certain purposes (that 
is, for the purpose of establishing the work as valid within the academy) 
there is a tendency to emphasise what is held in common and to be rather 
reticent in exploring, in a sense exposing, what remains in contention. This 
is particularly if it looks, from a scholastic perspective, as if these issues 
of contention run so deep that they might threaten to implode an ‘area’ 
which presents the semblance of a unity of approach, and especially if that 
semblance of unity has been thought to be a necessary condition for its 
reception into the academy. 
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Further, many feminists who have been active in the women’s movement, 
know that too often feminist political work can become mired in a 
complex of internal disputations which threaten to block effective political 
engagement. I remember a recent conference on women and law, at which 
the panel of speakers, including myself, having spoken over a wide range 
of issues, were faced with hostile questioning from an audience which took 
as its major thrust of critique, the fact that the panel did not ‘speak to them’ 
in the sense of ‘for them’. It did not address what they saw as their major 
concerns, at that point in time, from their position and experiences. The 
impact of this on me was that I felt silenced, as if by not managing to 
address all the potential audiences and issues with a sense of immediacy 
to them, I should not speak at all. Now, in retrospect, I think this experience 
can be used positively to remind ourselves of the tension between 
presenting ‘feminism’ as ‘a thing’ of sufficient form and coherence to 
be mobilised as an important area of scholarship, and recognising the 
continued contentions in feminism, in particular the very different aspirations 
which women bring to the promise of feminism. Let me put it this 
way: As feminists we seek the greatest possible change for the greatest 
number. At the same time we are increasingly aware that we have to be 
modest in the ways in which we go about change: modest, in that the task 
is so huge that finding patterns for change is extremely difficult; modest 
also in remembering and recognising the diversity of the project, in the 
sense of the very different needs, aspirations, and agendas which women, 
impacted within their own sites by specific patterns of oppression, bring to 
the project of change, at least in a more immediate time scale. Whilst we 
recognise the complexity of these issues, we also recognise that “evidence 
of the continued global oppression of women remains overwhelming” 
(Conaghan, 2000, p. 354). 
However, these tensions within feminism, as presented within the 
academy, play out in a way which suggests that feminist scholars are not 
always comfortable about examining them too closely, particularly when 
they might seem to challenge the presentation of feminism as sufficiently 
coherent for ‘it’ to have a recognised presence within academic work; in 
other words for ‘it’ to become an item on the academic, scholastic agenda. 
When a small group of us were asked, some years ago, to contribute a 
chapter on feminism to a collection on critical legal studies, we chose to 
present a paper which centred on a series of challenges to both established 
and critical law work. The editor immediately came back to us and said 
that what was actually required was that we describe and introduce to the 
readers the feminist agenda. We refused to do this and wrote a second 
version of the paper arguing that feminism was not to be thought of as 
only having a validity if we could produce a neat coherent account of it 
within standard scholastic terms and that what we wanted to do was to lay 
down a challenge to the ways in which ‘they’ were willing to apprehend 
feminism (Bottomley et al., 1987). Since then, feminists have moved on 
to explore ways in which feminism can be brought into the academy, and, 
again, it was the establishment of journals such as this one, which helped 
not only to profile and develop feminist work, but also to provide a space 
for debating between ourselves the continued contentions within feminism. 
It could be argued that it is a recognition of the extent of the impact 
of feminism within the academy which gives rise to my article now, in 
this place and in the form in which I have cast it. At first blush, it is a 
recognition of a real level of success in feminist scholastic work in terms of 
the status it is now given as opposed to a decade, or certainly two decades 
ago. But, I will argue that this has been bought at a cost which we should 
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be willing to acknowledge and consider. The cost is that the acceptance 
of the work has been achieved by presenting it in the terms which the 
editor of the critical law collection so many years ago said was necessary, 
presenting it as sufficiently coherent, in theoretical terms, to be established 
as a ‘body of work’ analogous to a ‘school of thought’. How this has been 
achieved is the focus of this article. My argument is that in order to achieve 
this level of recognition, feminist scholarship has been rendered into a 
particular form which ‘fits’ current scholastic imperatives and that, in a 
negative sense, by linking feminism to scholarship of that form, we actually 
tie the future of feminist scholarship (and political interventions) into 
a particular set of practices which limit our potential. I believe that this is 
already evident, both in the resistance that many younger women scholars 
feel to being seen as part of this thing called (the label of) ‘feminism’, 
despite the shared characteristics of their own commitment to feminism 
and the ways in which their own work could clearly be read as ‘feminist’, 
and in the difficulty with which many feminist scholars (that is those who 
accept and use the label) engage with emerging critical scholarship, as if it 
is somehow likely to threaten feminism rather than possibly open us to new 
ideas, new alliances which could strengthen feminism both as scholarship 
and as a source of new ways to engage politically. 
To begin to explore this must be done modestly, even if my tone will 
sometimes be assertive in order to try and emphasise the argument I am 
making. I want to make clear that I undertake my project in a particular 
way. I want to find a way of exploring the construction of feminist theory 
within the academy (that is of feminism as a mature scholastic enterprise) 
which does not suggest that I am saying that such an engagement is necessarily 
wrong. I am more interested, in a Foucauldian sense, with looking 
back at what has happened and analysing why, within a particular institution 
(the academy of law, at this particular conjuncture), knowledges of 
feminism are produced, and reproduced, in a particular way and with a 
particular impact. I do not want to suggest that there might have been a 
better way, let alone a more proper way. But I do want to suggest that 
we need to be much more aware of the impact that the presentation of 
feminism as a theoretical and scholastic enterprise has had. Further, I 
want to go on to suggest that the range of feminist work, as well as the 
potential of it, is not limited to constructing feminist scholarship in one 
form. To emphasise this point I shall call the particular form of, or trend 
within, feminist scholarship, a ‘feminist orthodoxy’. What I will suggest 
is that without careful examination of the emergence of this orthodoxy, it 
threatens to limit, hold back and possibly stagnate the potential of feminist 
scholarship in law. 
My construction of a ‘feminist orthodoxy’ is contentious in that I am 
presenting a ‘type’ or ‘trend’ which many readers might think I wish to 
use as a label of criticism and will want to know exactly who, as scholars, 
I think are implicated. This approach might seem to be amplified by the 
method I have adopted, which is to focus on one text alone as exemplifying 
characteristics of this ‘orthodoxy’. In fact I think that we are all, 
necessarily, implicated in that all of us who work as scholars within the 
legal academy cannot be innocent of, or avoid the use or impact of, the 
imperatives that construct us as scholars within a particular enterprise. 
However, some of us seem more willing to work within these imperatives, 
without close examination of them, than others and therefore their work 
becomes overtly marked as being constructed within those patterns.Within 
these terms we can use one text to excavate trends which are more overt 
within that text than similar texts, but are actually present, to some extent, 
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in much of our work. In this sense then, highlighting a ‘feminist orthodoxy’ 
is about patterns in feminist scholarship rather than the work of particular 
scholars, but it would be dishonest of me not to admit that I believe it 
marks some scholarship (and therefore some scholars) much more clearly 
than others, and that therefore I am suggesting that certain work is not only 
representative of the construction of a ‘feminist orthodoxy’ but is more 
clearly implicated in that construction. 
Moreover, the characteristics of this feminist orthodoxy are largely 
attributable to the imperatives of the academy, rather than to anything we 
would recognise as specifically ‘feminist’. To make such a statement is 
neither profound nor controversial; none of us would expect feminist scholarship 
to claim a heritage or a pathway which is innocent of the broader 
context of scholarship and the place within which it is pursued. Neither 
do I view such a recognition as particularly problematic. As scholars who 
are feminists, it is to be expected that we wish to develop scholarship, 
informed by our feminism and constituted as exploring and developing 
feminist ideas and concerns, which is also acceptable as a valid scholastic 
enterprise. 
Whereas once, perhaps two decades ago, and within the context of a 
very vibrant women’s movement in the U.K. at least, it might have seemed 
that the argument I am about to construct is essentially a concern about 
the incorporation of feminism into the academy, a kind of co-opting which 
might threaten to sever feminist work from a political context, my current 
concern is different, addressed as it necessarily is, to a very different 
contemporary situation within as well as outside the academy to that faced 
two decades ago. My concern is to examine the extent to which feminist 
scholarship has come to be dominated by a set of core themes and methodological 
presumptions which, I shall argue, threaten to limit the potential 
of feminist work. 
Although this article does no more than try and open up to scrutiny 
the ways in which the imperatives of the academy have tended to lead to 
the construction of feminist scholarship within a particular form, I argue 
that this process has led to the privileging of certain types of feminist 
work which fit a particular model, the ‘orthodox’, and to the consequent 
marginalising of other work and that this process could threaten the potential 
diversity and vitality of feminist scholarship which does not meet this 
model. I argue further that a suturing of feminist scholarship to a dominant 
orthodox model, threatens to marginalise feminism in terms of developing 
patterns of scholastic work. These developing patterns might well, and I 
believe can, help us to think new forms of feminism for new futures, but 
in order to open ourselves to these possibilities we have to be willing to 
examine the ways in which we have come to presume that feminist scholarship 
is necessarily marked by certain characteristics in order for it to be 
recognisably feminist. 
In other words, I am calling into question the way in which the 
form of feminist knowledge which I label orthodox, is produced and 
constructed. There are two (closely related) contexts which need to 
be examined: first, the imperatives of the academy, especially the law 
academy, which tend to provoke in us certain patterns of engagement and; 
second, the dominant theoretical paradigm used in the academy, which 
remains wedded to a presumption of scholastic engagement as a dialectical 
process of progressive synthesis. My purpose is to argue that a significant 
account of feminist scholarship has been constituted into an orthodox form 
as it has responded to these contexts, reproducing them in a way which 
has come to suggest that this is the only form that feminism within the 
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academy can take in order for it to be recognised as such. The construction 
of this trend to orthodoxy needs to be understood, not to be dismissed 
or devalued, but to be ‘placed’, so that we understand it not as a full or 
final account of the potential of feminism, but rather as one account of 
one form of feminist scholarship. In so doing, we can become much more 
aware of how prevailing powers tend to shape scholarship, but also of the 
potentials of other forms of scholarship and, as feminists, open ourselves 
to the possibilities of them. 
 
A NOTE ON METHOD 
 
I have chosen to focus my arguments through the close reading of one 
text written by a feminist scholar and am very aware of the dangers of so 
doing. First, my article might then be thought of as an extended critique 
of the work of this scholar, which it is not intended to be. It is, rather, 
an examination of one particular text and the ways in which that text has 
taken form. It does not hold the author responsible for what I shall argue is 
carried in the text. Further, I am using this text to exemplify the production 
of what I have already suggested is my main focus, that is the development 
of a ‘feminist orthodoxy’. So, second, I am open to the criticism that in 
using the text to bear such a weight I am reading too much into it or that it 
is not a fair representation of the broader pattern of development to which 
I am alluding. I am aware of the potential force of these criticisms, and I 
have some points tomake, at this stage, to explain if not defend mymethod. 
As feminist scholarship has developed within the academy of law, it 
has become commonplace to offer histories and maps to introduce others 
to the field and give them a resource to help them find their way around 
and locate specific debates and materials. Many have found such surveys 
useful, whether as sympathetic researchers or younger feminist scholars 
wishing to enter the field. Moreover, as courses have developed focused 
on feminist material, such surveys, whether constituted as papers or books, 
have become a major resource. Any text which offers itself as such a 
mapping exercise can be examined on its own terms, as an exercise in 
constructing a survey of the field, that is as an act of representation. One 
might open to question how well, how accurately, the field is represented, 
but my questioning is not in these terms. It is, rather, to look at how the 
field is constituted within that representation.1 The text I have chosen to 
examine does offer an account of the development of feminist scholarship 
within the academy of law. In fact, it is constituted as a celebration of the 
development of such scholarship to other scholars whomay be sympathetic 
to feminist work but not entirely conversant with it. Although within the 
text there are times when other feminists are being addressed, they are 
generally addressed in terms which make clear what the author considers 
to be the imperatives of feminist scholarship. Therefore, whilst the major 
thrust of the paper is to present feminist work to others, there is also 
a secondary text addressed to feminists, about what constitutes feminist 
scholarship in order for it to continue to be vibrant. Within these terms, it 
seems to me to be fair to open the text to a close reading of its construction 
as exemplifying a certain pattern of work. 
The reading I am about to engage upon does not open the text to critique 
in the sense of suggesting it is somehow partial or lacking in its presentation 
– that it could have been improved upon if it had addressed other issues 
for instance. Rather my reading seeks to look at the way in which the text 
is constructed and to consider this construction, not merely in relation to 
the question of the (re)presentation of the field of feminist scholarship, but 
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also in terms of why it has come to be presented in a particular way and 
the consequences of that presentation. My reading is aimed at examining 
issues of the production of knowledge, specifically how knowledges of and 
within feminist scholarship are constituted. 
So, finally, it must be underlined that I am not concerned either with 
judging the normative value of the text, or seeking to replace it with a better 
text. This is simply, modestly, asking what forces have helped constitute 
the text in a particular way and with what possible effect. I do suggest 
that this is indicative of a pattern within feminist scholarship which I have 
called orthodox and that, as with all orthodoxies, it should be recognised 
that this can become a limitation on other work developing within the field. 
But this is not to argue that the orthodox position is invalid, simply to 
contend that it if it is allowed to stand without examination, it can operate 
to over-determine the field and limit potentials in other directions. If there 
is a baseline for me it is this: Any orthodoxy which is constituted either as 
the authoritative voice of a field or as establishing the key indices of work 
within that field, inevitably threatens to function as a power block which 
will begin to operate as a force of recognition and exclusion. It is that of 
which we must be wary. 
 
ENCOUNTERING LEGAL FEMINISM 
 
The text I have chosen as a focus is entitled In Praise of Legal Feminism 
(Naffine, 2002). It was written, originally, as a keynote speech for a British 
conference of socio-legal scholars and was, I am told, generally very well 
received. It is important to note this origin. A text written for a conference 
is addressing a very specific audience, in this case a group of scholars who 
could generally be taken as likely to be well-disposed towards the speaker 
and her subject, certainly unlikely to be immediately dismissive but equally 
likely to be well-meaning rather than particularly well-informed. The text 
begins with these words: 
 
Within the legal academy, the achievements of feminists have been substantial and cumulative. 
This paper is both a critical and appreciative reflection upon them. It extends praise 
to legal feminists for their contribution to our understanding of law, but concedes the 
intellectual difficulties encountered, and sometimes even engendered, by feminists. What 
is unusual and commendable about the writing of feminists is its intellectual transparency 
(Naffine, 2002, p. 71). 
 
And ends with: 
 
The changing of the legal mind still depends on the continuing goodwill of fair minded 
men (and women) who are willing to listen to feminist scholars and to learn from them, 
and thus to enter into dialogue . . . They must suspend old ways of thinking and embrace 
open scholarly debate (Naffine, 2002, p. 101). 
 
The purpose of the text is clear – it is addressed principally to “fair minded 
men” demanding of them that they move from being merely well-meaning 
to actually engaging with feminist scholars. It is a totally commendable 
strategic move to appear before such an audience and demand to be taken 
seriously as colleagues. But note, even at this point, how the case is 
presented. 
Firstly, we have the use of a very ‘tight’ name for the project, “legal 
feminism”.2 I have argued before that the process of naming, of giving 
an identity through this process, is not innocent and carries very specific 
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messages (Bottomley, 2000). The identity suggested here is one which not 
merely brackets feminist and legal scholarship but suggests a fusion, it 
has become presented as an identity in its own right by being given a 
particular form of name. We have moved one step on from the present 
general use of ‘feminist legal scholarship’. What is suggested by the term, 
is that we are now more than feminists working in law with a commitment 
to our feminism, and our work is now constituted in a form that suggests 
a ‘school of thought’.3 Not merely a useful chapter heading for a book on 
jurisprudence, this act of naming a body of work in the form of a school 
of thought implies that the work has achieved a level of maturity which is 
commensurate to the established schools of thought. In other words, it can 
meet and match them within the terrain of legal theory. 
Such an act of naming must then be backed by evidence of a coherent 
identity. This is initially alluded to in two ways. First by the simple assertion 
that much has been already been achieved (it is both “substantial and 
cumulative”) in contributing to “our understanding of law” (a neat rhetorical 
device here – feminists are introduced in the third person, the author 
stands apart from “them” and ‘praises them’ and then uses the second 
person to confirm her position with the audience in ‘our’ understanding); 
second, by introducing the paper as a “critical and appreciative reflection”, 
which will amount to a cataloging of “legal feminism”, giving it a history 
and a geography. 
Narratives to establish identity usually activate three scenarios: an 
account of origins, a geography of the terrain (premises, principles and 
methods), and a map for future work. They are generally assertive in 
their tone and compelling in their arguments – they are stories of arrival. 
The rhetorical strength of the argument is premised on an assertion that 
so much has already been achieved that it now demands recognition. 
Foundations are already well laid, we are now building above ground. To 
move forward within these terms is therefore to have to accept that the 
foundations are, indeed, well laid. 
Within the context of the giving of this paper, this is an understandable 
strategic move. The problem however is that such a presentation demands 
that a coherent account of feminism is presented which will make the best 
case for inclusion. At the bottom of the first page the author alludes to the 
problem of ‘speaking for all feminists’ (my words not hers) by observing 
“feminist reproaching feminist for failure to pay sufficient regard to all the 
subtleties of the feminist project”. She then notes in a footnote that: 
 
. . . the feminist project is not singular. As I will endeavor to show, there is a number of, 
mainly constructive, debates among feminists about their appropriate aims and methods. 
And, of course, feminist scholars possess a broad range of intellectual and feminist backgrounds 
. . .My intention, however, is to draw out the communalities of purpose of feminist 
legal scholarship, to enable a view of legal feminism as a whole (Naffine, 2002, fn. 2, 
p. 71).4 
 
It is my contention that drawing out these “communalities” is a dangerous 
enterprise when they are put to the purpose of constructing an internal 
coherence (and direction) for “legal feminism as a whole”. It is this which 
helps to begin to construct an orthodoxy – an act of recognition, by a 
feminist, of what can be held together within ‘the’ project, which becomes 
in effect the claim to an identity. My sense is that a reference in a footnote 
noting that the project “is not singular” will easily get lost. Indeed, the 
placing of it in such a form suggests that it is can be overcome, especially 
when the purpose of the paper is to make it clear that the lack of “singularity” 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Feminist Legal Studies, 12 (1). pp. 29-65 
- 8 - 
 
 
is an issue which can be trumped by “drawing out communalities”. 
That this can be an act of not only drawing together but also of delimitation, 
that boundaries as well as internal “communalities” may be being 
constructed, is not, necessarily not, examined.5 What is important here is 
to put the focus on things which can be held together, presented as already 
constituting a form, an identity, which deserves recognition. 
Despite the reference to “intellectual transparency”, what cannot within 
this context be transparent is examining the felt need to present an image 
of ‘the project’ moving forward as a thing called ‘legal feminism’. Why 
is it powerful to render the diverse body of feminist scholarship into one 
body of ‘legal feminism’ in this way? It is because the claim for recognition 
of the work is actually a claim for inclusion into the academy at a 
particular level, as a ‘school of thought’, as a body of knowledge, which 
can be presented within terms the academy recognises and privileges as 
‘legal theory’. This is a much greater claim than to a space for ‘feminist 
scholarship on law’ or a holding together of a diverse set of practices called 
‘feminist perspectives on law’, this is rendering ‘the feminist project’, I 
would argue, into a coherent identifiable body of knowledge named ‘legal 
feminism’. 
I will go further and suggest that the text is presented through two 
tropes: one, providing the evidence to justify such a claim and second, 
disciplining the difficult, awkward, uneven features of feminist scholarship 
into a form which can sustain that claim. In these terms it is particularly 
ironic that references, in the first paragraphs, to the transparency of 
feminist scholarship (and later also to its generosity) as well as to the difficulties 
encountered (and engendered!) by feminist scholars, will become 
woven into a narrative which indicates (argues for) the way forward that 
all of us (can) share. 
However, constructing ‘legal feminism’ turns out to be rather problematic 
when the text has to engage with the many heritages of feminist work 
in law. 
 
FUSING IDENTITY FROM THE THREADS OF DIVERSE HERITAGES 
 
In praising the achievements of ‘legal feminism’, the author begins by 
outlining its purpose: 
 
The general purpose of legal feminism is to make sense of the many ways gender shapes 
law, to reveal the many ways that law, as a consequence, harms women, and to try to change 
law so that women are helped (Naffine, 2002, p. 72). 
 
Within this pattern of argumentation, feminist engagement with law is 
premised on looking at the ways in which law “harms” women and finding 
ways of alleviating this. Taking this starting point is understandable. Early 
feminist work necessarily located itself in this way, as a concern to challenge 
the gender blindness of academic work and the marginalisation of 
‘women’s issues’ (if they were recognised at all), as well as responding to 
work with feminist activists outside the academy on issues of oppression 
and demands for law reform. 
However, by introducing ‘legal feminism’ in this way, we begin with a 
firm if, some might argue limited, focus and a series of presumptions which 
lead work in a very particular direction. How gender shapes law/revealing 
harm/change in law is the tripartite configuration of the field. The suggestion 
seems to be that of a series of moves, from gender to harm to reform, 
and from general theory to specific examples to proposals for change. As 
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feminist work developed, there was certainly a concern to situate proposals 
for reform within a broader analysis of law which sought to be predictive 
as to the relative merits of any proposal for reform, both in terms of likely 
impact on the immediate issue and the possible impact on related issues 
(see, for example, Bottomley and Conaghan, 1993). In that sense a need 
for work of a more abstract and theoretical nature was widely recognised. 
Within these terms, it seemed that any theoretical project was entered into 
very purposefully. However, a number of issues have arisen subsequently 
which make this configuration more problematic. 
First, there is the question of the extent to which a focus on gendered 
harm might skew a good analysis of law and tend to lead to generalised 
statements which turn out to be not quite so easy to sustain (Bottomley, 
2000). Second, there is the question of how far this emphasis on the 
productive role of theory tends to limit our investigations of the potential 
of theoretical work by presuming that any engagement with theory must be 
based on reaffirming ontological and normative themes within theoretical 
work (Drakopoulou, 2000a, b). 
The particular configuration laid out in the text carries an implied 
reversal of what I suggested above was an historical account of how 
many of us moved as feminists into theoretical work – from immediate 
engagements to looking for a more theoretical context from which to try 
and develop more carefully considered strategies for engagement. The 
reversal gives primacy to theoretical engagement, although the purpose 
remains one in which the promise of reform in and of law remains the 
central premise.6 Within these terms, theoretical work must be judged 
for its validity by two measures, its own internal coherence (the usual 
measure of the academy) plus its relevance and ability to yield product 
in terms of an agenda for change (the feminist imperative and measure of 
success). Holding this together, as legal feminism, is a heavy burden and 
one which asks more of scholars working within this terrain than most 
other academics. In an important sense, the text presents an argument that, 
despite problems, it can and has been done and, in making this argument, 
three key assumptions must be made: first, that we can answer the demands 
of scholarship; second that we can answer the demands of feminists, by; 
third, providing a model of work which meets each imperative under one 
rubric. 
But before I proceed with this argument, what might seem like a digression 
is important. Within the academy of law, many of us were educated 
in a tradition which divorced theory from practice, and that division was 
something which we clearly, as feminists, wished to challenge. Finding 
a way to bring these tropes together within one field of work is something 
for which many of us have strived; the questions will always remain 
‘why’ and ‘how’ we achieve, if we do, the delineation of such a field. The 
imperatives of academic work, let alone feminist imperatives, mean that 
the presentation of feminist work which can be both theoretically coherent 
and productive of agendas for reform is, in law schools, compelling. On 
the one hand, to engage with theory and yet, at the same time, have 
agendas for change, suits the modern academy which strives, increasingly, 
to show its relevance to world-outside, all the while asserting that world inside 
is worth defending as it houses a body of scholars who not only 
produce work for now but also engage in ‘blue-skies’ thinking. In other 
words, we are not merely technocrats for our discipline, policy-makers in 
a kind of extra-mural government department, but remain more than that. 
Presenting feminism as being concerned with and able to deliver on both 
fronts is actually congruent with the developing climate in universities. So, 
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an argument constructed for inclusion into the academy, emphasising the 
incorporation of theory/practice within an identity called legal feminism, 
will resonate. What is required, however, in a text such as this and aimed 
at such an audience, is the construction of a model which presents this as 
a coherent project in theoretical terms. 
Constructing feminist scholarship in law into a form which can be 
rendered an identity called ‘legal feminism’ not only requires finding 
a model which brings together theory/practice, but also a model which 
brings together very divergent work marked, on the one hand, by traces of 
concerns and methods derived from the social sciences, and on the other 
hand, by traces of concerns and methods derived from the humanities. 
Again, it could be argued that it is a strength of feminist work that it refuses 
to be bound within either disciplinary complex. Many of us feel uncomfortable 
with that division. The tendency in plate-glass universities to place 
us firmly in the social sciences was, for instance, a real hindrance to those 
of us more interested in work associated with the humanities (Bottomley, 
1997). At the same time, it seems to me that feminist scholarship in law 
has often taken on a very heavy burden in trying to address a broad range 
of materials and issues raised about law within, or derived from, distinct 
disciplinary bases. When we examine more carefully the tripartite configuration 
of legal feminism, it should be noted that we move through a 
range of registers, moving between work derived from the social sciences 
and work derived from the humanities. Again, as with theory/practice, 
it could well be that in bringing this work together, the presentation of 
legal feminism seems strengthened by the incorporation of such a range of 
scholarship. And, again, it is not without its counterpart in other sections 
of the academy. It has become, for instance, a feature of the socio-legal 
movement that it no longer regards itself as limited to social science 
methodology, and so for feminists to refuse a disciplinary divide is again 
resonant. But what this means is that trying to hold legal feminism as an 
identity incorporating all these tropes is, again, going to require a model 
which affirms that all aspects of the tripartite configuration are brought 
together, synthesised within one model of scholarship. All the time what 
is being presented is a picture not merely of the range of work, but of a 
synthesis of that work. 
There are many important questions which could be teased out here 
– but I want to concentrate on the construction of legal feminism as 
providing a particular image of feminist scholarship. First, there is the 
mark of a mixture of heritages, which are brought together as if they 
coalesce. Second, theory comes first. In a sense, it is the development of 
theory which will give direction to the project and hold the whole thing 
together. But, third, theory must be capable of delivering an agenda (or 
agendas) for reform. 
At one level, this could be read as a fair description of much feminist 
work to date. However, there is now a substantial body of literature 
within feminist scholarship which has spoken to a concern that by taking 
this as ‘the’ rather than ‘a’ modus operandi, it has limited feminist 
work to focusing on clear incidents of ‘harm’ and thereby tending to 
skew a broader critique of, and engagement with, law (see, for example, 
Bottomley, 2000). Are we to limit ourselves, be limited, to this account 
of feminist work? Is the only validity for any feminist engagement, that it 
will produce patterns/agendas for change, as meaning reform of law? And 
what presumptions does it make about the kind of theory we are looking 
for/constructing (Drakopoulou, 2000a, b)? It is at this point that I would 
argue that we could easily slip from a way of describing (much) feminist 
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work, to ascribing the form which feminist work will take in order for it 
to be recognised as ‘feminist’. In other words ‘legal feminism’ could be 
read as exemplifying the beginning of an orthodoxy. In order for ‘legal 
feminism’ to be presented as focused and coherent, feminist scholarship 
becomes limited to that which will fit this picture. But it is not merely 
scholarship of a theoretical nature which might be placed outside this 
presentation of ‘legal feminism’ it is also, conversely, feminist scholarship 
which is not sufficiently theoretical within the terms set out later in the 
text. 
If feminist scholarship has already engaged with law within the 
tripartite configuration suggested in the text, what success has it had? 
Within the text we are told that: 
 
Feminists have convincingly demonstrated law’s failure to make sense of many aspects of 
women’s lives, and yet legal institutions have proved remarkably resistant to feminism and 
its findings (Naffine, 2002, p. 72). 
 
Obviously how we measure success, failure or resistance is problematic, 
but, as it happens, within this text (and perhaps understandably given the 
context of its origins) the author focuses not on “legal institutions” in 
general, and hence the need to address the issue of the relative merit of 
being reform-focused, but rather the academy of law. The text concludes 
by saying of orthodox jurisprudence that: 
 
It has been reluctant to concede that new points of view might be better than well-used 
ones. It has been unwilling to concede that it own view is necessarily limited, partial and 
so constantly in need of revision . . . The changing of the legal mind still depends on the 
continuing goodwill of fair-minded men (and women) who are willing to listen to feminist 
scholars and to learn from them, and thus to enter into dialogue. Faced with the ‘irregular 
case’ of women, they must do more than just ‘shrug their shoulders’ and proceed with 
business as usual. They must suspend old ways of thinking and embrace open scholarly 
debate (Naffine, 2002, p. 101). 
 
Within this context, what matters in the end is the measure of success 
in terms of ‘legal feminism’ being recognised and engaged with in the 
academy as legal theory. What began as requiring that any project of 
reform is underpinned by good theoretical work, has become the need for 
a coherent body of theory which we can then look to, to deliver a basis for 
engagement with law (reform). 
Embedded within this account of ‘legal feminism’s’ demand for 
engagement within the academy, is a very clear picture of how knowledge 
proceeds: from partial tomore complete accounts. It is a dialectical process 
requiring open, scholarly debate, in which feminism, as the counterpoint to 
the present orthodoxy of jurisprudence, is posited as the antithesis which, 
if synthesised into jurisprudence, will move us all forward as scholars 
together. Presumed is the process of scholarly progress; presumed also is 
the idea that by using the tools and methods of that process, we can and will 
proceed. All that is letting us down is that we are not listened to carefully 
enough and with enough seriousness. It is rather like saying – we deserve 
it because we have all the marks of scholarship which you expect – and 
then wondering why the task turns out to be quite so difficult. Although 
the focus in this context is on fair-minded men, perhaps we should also 
consider how far it is possible to discipline feminist scholarship into the 
coherent project which ‘legal feminism’ seems to require of us, as well as 
asking whether the picture of inclusion into the academy is not rather too 
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I suggest that presenting feminist scholarship as ‘legal feminism’ ready 
to demand “open scholarly debate” is premised on two principles: first, 
that feminist scholarship itself can be constructed as sufficiently coherent, 
as well as carrying significant material of import to all scholars, to be 
spoken and heard within “open scholarly debate”; and, second, that “open 
scholarly debate” is something which we all understand and can share 
in the academy. We can find ground upon which to meet and exchange 
ideas. This presumes, further, that “fair-minded” scholars will be won 
over by evidence and argumentation of a certain level of strength, and 
that the promise of challenging the present partial account of law with 
the offer of a fuller account, will enable the presentation of a complete 
picture. In other words, this construction of the production of knowledge is 
premised upon a particular image of scholarship, the pursuit of truth, and a 
particular method, a dialectical process through which we progress towards 
truth. This image ignores critical questions of power and the production of 
knowledge as constituted within the academy. This does not mean that we 
cannot strategically use this construction of academic work, just as we can 
strategically use the idea of the rule of law, but it does mean that we have 
to be aware of how and why we are using it and keep open a recognition 
of the limits as much as the benefits of such a play. 
Keeping in mind the construction of knowledge is essential when we 
move, as in the text, into an account of what we do which focuses on the 
object of study and the methods by which it is studied. It is all too easy 
to slip from thinking about the production of scholarship and our role as 
scholars, to an account which presumes the attributes of scholarship as 
given. 
The “general purpose of legal feminism” is revealing harm to women. 
As this is played through in the text, we encounter a trope which requires 
that ‘woman’ as the object-of-study becomes visible. The text attempts to 
synthesise work which presents ‘woman’ in this way, and, in so doing, 
moves within and through the territories of law, sociology and philosophy, 
our tripartite heritage, without addressing any methodological issues that 
might arise from bringing them into relation with each other. Within this 
terrain, the figure which must be found and addressed, is that of ‘woman’. 
How this is achieved and the consequences of these moves are issues to 
which I now turn. 
 
THE FIGURE OF WOMAN IN LAW 
 
The first presentation of this figure is of woman as harmed by law, in 
other words as the ‘victim’ of law. Focusing feminist scholarship is this 
way might seem to be uncontroversial – there may be some problems, 
already alluded to, but the principle thrust would seem to describe much 
feminist work. But if this is ‘the’ motor of feminist engagement, what are 
the potential consequences of playing it through in this way? I mean here, 
not the potential for revealing the effect of law on certain women in certain 
circumstances, nor the possible linkages to a package of proposed reforms, 
but rather the need to think of it as presented as fundamental to the feminist 
project and method, as a fundamental constituent of our engagement with 
theory. 
Presenting woman-as-victim leads to an account of law as either letting 
women down by not protecting them sufficiently or, in its very construction, 
as itself harmful to women or exacerbating harm to women. Within 
this trope, revealing harm and its extent then moves to proposals for change 
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in order to alleviate that harm. It is questionable how far any legal change 
can impact on the harm identified but the sense is that we should continue 
to try and look for some change rather than none – anything else would be 
to turn away from the problem we have revealed through our work and not 
put to use our skills as lawyers rather than as mere social scientists. This 
seems to be the only possible, ethical, reason for our engagement with law 
and so much a feature of feminist work as to be uncontroversial. But it can, 
possibly always will, reproduce features which are in fact problematic both 
in terms of a method per se as well as in terms of an ethical engagement, 
particularly if they are not recognised. 
I wish to take some time in exploring a quite different way of thinking 
through this form of engagement and considering its consequences. 
 
ENCOUNTERING BADIOU’S ETHICS 
 
By using one aspect of a text by a modern French philosopher, Alain 
Badiou (2002), I hope more clearly to critique this aspect of feminist work 
which has become central to the orthodoxy expressed in ‘legal feminism’. 
 
There are a number of reasons for pursuing this. First, it posits one example 
of how description may become ascription and then carry with it certain 
detrimental effects. Second, in examining its construction we can gain 
more insight into why it has been reproduced as central to feminist purpose 
and method and ask whether it is necessary to keep this as ‘the’ focus. 
Third, examining the attempts to hold this together as purpose and method, 
to keep stable something which is regularly rendered problematic and 
threatens to destabilise the feminist project as presented within the terms of 
legal feminism, might help open to question whether it is the most useful 
way to move forward. Heroic efforts have to be made to stabilise it, but, 
for reasons I will suggest, it is presumed that without this object of study 
and the method by which it is studied, feminism will somehow unravel, at 
least feminism as we know it. 
On the presumption that Badiou’s work is not necessarily familiar to 
scholars working within law, I need to begin by outlining something of 
his extended essay which was, he tells us in his introduction, written at 
speed and at the request of a friend for publication in a series of books 
aimed at introducing key philosophical ideas and debates to undergraduates 
and children. It is an unashamedly polemical tract, written with a 
sense of surging anger, in which he speaks of his need to counter the 
interpretation of recent and current political events and of the need to 
create a philosophical and political position which will allow for truly 
radical intervention against the dominant orthodoxies – which include, 
for Badiou, the orthodoxy of the seemingly radical position of building 
ethics based on a concern for ‘the other’. There are three major moves in 
Ethics: his refusal of an ‘ethics’ grounded in ‘the other’; consequently, his 
refusal of the dominant “politico-ethics” of human rights; and finally his 
commitment to “an ethic of truth” as an affirmative practice. 
His refusal of an ethics grounded in ‘the other’ can be read as a critique 
of Emmanuel Levinas, but is actually aimed at work inspired by or attributed 
to the influence of Levinas, and in the sense that the use of Levinas 
exemplifies or is strongly congruent with the ‘mood’ and ‘mode’ of our 
times: 
 
For the honour of philosophy, it is first of all necessary to say that this ideology of a ‘right 
to difference’, the contemporary catechism of goodwill with regard to ‘other cultures’, is 
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strikingly distant from Levinas’s actual conception of things. 
The heart of the question concerns the presumption of a universal human Subject, capable 
of reducing ethical issues to matters of human rights and humanitarian actions. 
. . . ethics subordinates the identification of this subject to the universal recognition of the 
evil that is done to him. Ethics thus defines man as a victim (Badiou, 2002, p. 10).7 
7 The refusal of the foundationary figure of ‘victim‘ is, of course, first made in the work 
of Nietzsche. 
 
Badiou starts from asserting that there are two primary indices of this mode 
of thinking which must be focused upon and answered: “the presumption 
of evil” and “the subject defined as victim”. His project overall is to refuse 
this form of ‘ethics’ and construct, in the alternative, an “ethical practice 
of truth”. The refusal is absolute. At this point I do not want to examine 
his alternative, but rather to concentrate on his reasons for refusing what 
has become constituted as ‘ethics’ premised on ‘the other’: 
 
. . . the ethical primacy of the Other over the Same requires that the experience of alterity be 
ontologically ‘guaranteed’ as the experience of a distance, of an essential non-identity, the 
traversal of which is the ethical experience itself. But nothing in this simple phenomenon 
of the other contains such a guarantee. And this simply because the finitude of the other’s 
appearing certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as imitation, and thus lead back 
to the logic of the Same. The other always resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an 
originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true (Badiou, 2002, p. 21). 
 
In other words, the very idea of being able to ‘become’ an ethical subject 
via, and only via the apprehension of the “fleshy epiphany” of the face 
of ‘the other’, is to return to the simple problem of how we will ‘know’ 
the other as authentic, and authentic not only within their own terms but 
our own, if we do not ‘know’ ourselves. Thus the move to open us “to an 
ethical opening to alterity”, in fact returns us to the same conundrum.What 
Badiou, to me, suggests is not only the inherent impossibility of this move 
as authentic, but also the very selfishness of it.8 It places ‘other’ as a necessary 
gesture in making an ‘ethical-self’. Badiou suggests that, in practice, 
this becomes associated with two “congruent effects”: first, the valorisation 
of an ‘ethics of difference’ in which respect for ‘the other’ becomes not 
merely a concern to ‘see’ other but to respond to the needs of the ‘otheras- 
victim’ – why? Because we have not thought of ourselves as anything 
but a subject who will find our ethical selves by so responding: We require 
of the other that they present to us as victim.9 ‘The ethics of difference’ is 
therefore, in truth, not a reciprocal device but one in which we constitute 
ourselves by finding an ‘other’ to confirm us. ‘Difference’ in these terms 
becomes a dialectical process in which we are led not merely to affirm the 
other, actually ourselves, but to offer to the ‘other’ the gesture of inclusion. 
 
8 It has been pointed out to me that I am using Badiou’s text here to make a point not 
raised within his own work – his concern is to critique the real potential of radical alterity, 
that is the real ‘otherness’ of ‘other’ in that it can only, in fact, be constructed on the basis 
of resemblance, that is what is like/unlike and that he is not concerned with knowledge 
of self in the way in which I suggest. To a great extent I accept this criticism but have 
decided to continue with my use of his text, not so much as a ‘reading’ of it, but as a way 
in which the text made me think of the particular aspect of construction of ethical-self. In 
these terms the words ‘suggest’ and ‘to me’ must be firmly born in mind! 
9 This is tied of course to his attack on the privileging of ‘evil’ within the work of 
Levinas. 
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This may seem contradictory but it is not. What is being suggested here is 
that the recognition of ‘difference’ in these terms becomes a need to find 
a way in which difference is both recognised and incorporated; otherwise 
we turn away from the face and leave what it represents to its own fate. 
We search for something abstract enough to incorporate difference, a gift 
we can offer which also, as it happens, will confirm our own privileges, 
‘ethics’, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘human rights’. 
There are, of course, a huge number of crucial leaps here, but that 
is one of Badiou’s strengths – he does not remain within the terrain of 
abstract scholarship in his critique but rather moves between the planes of 
the theoretical and the political. To “think the unthinkable” can begin by 
accessing this “congruent effect” either through the theoretical or the political 
planes – what is required is both a radically new process of thinking 
and a radically new form of politics. 
 
THE ETHICS OF ‘LEGAL FEMINISM’ 
 
What I want to suggest is that the ‘shock’ of Badiou into making us think 
about an ethics based on difference and then expressed in a politics of 
human rights, is a shock which feminist scholars can use, by analogy, 
to investigate and critically examine our own construction of an ethical 
practice for feminist scholarship based on ‘the other’. There is much more 
in Badiou’s work which will be of concern to feminists, but at this point 
I simply want to take one model of a shock to thought in relation to one 
area of work (Levinasian) which has become so attractive to scholars, and 
think it through in relation to our own scholarship as feminists in relation 
to the figure of woman-as-victim and the search for legal reform. 
The particular twist to ‘the ethics of the other’ played through within 
the text of legal feminism is that it moves in two directions: one is that 
it is presented as an issue of (ethical) scholarship, and the other that, 
consequently, although we are concerned with ‘women’ in general, we 
are focused on woman-as-victim within the legal system, as our object 
of study. Therefore within this particular narrative, there seems to be a 
double effect in that woman/feminist who is scholar, is doing the work of 
presenting ‘a face’ to be apprehended by her and other scholars. Let me 
play this out more fully with regard to the text under discussion. 
Although the text begins with the evocation of woman-victim of law, 
it moves swiftly on to the achievements of women scholars, as this is the 
focus of the demand for inclusion in the academy. Women legal scholars 
are: 
 
. . . insiders who can interpret law, apply it, and even earn a living from it. They are fluent 
in legal language, and so they are able players of “the language games” of law. To nonlawyers, 
feminist lawyers are an elite; they are in the legal club (Naffine, 2002, p. 77). 
 
By having become ‘insiders’, although she emphasises their marginal 
status within that club, women legal scholars find they have created an 
‘other’: the women clients of the system of which they are now a part. 
Having reviewed the problem of the “fear of essentialism”10 (how do we 
cope with the ‘ethics of difference’? – which I will come back to) and 
moved on to the “partial paralysis of theory and practice” (which again 
I will come back to), the author argues for the “ethical duty” of feminist 
scholarship: 
 
. . . those with the time, the resources and the education are better placed to develop 
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effective arguments for social and legal change based on good and persuasive research. The 
woman on the production line in the car factory may be less well located to analyse her 
situation, historically, economically and politically, and to articulate her concerns convincingly, 
than the person whose job is dedicated to analysing her situation as a professional and 
intellectual task. Indeed, this may be said to be the ethical duty of intellectuals – to bring 
a larger view to the understanding of an individual’s situation. If the feminist intellectual 
will not speak for this woman, then perhaps no one will (Naffine, 2002, p. 92). 
 
She here reproduces the very slippage that Badiou warns us about: her 
“ethical duty” becomes translated into a confirmation of what she has 
to offer and therefore a confirmation of herself. What is on offer and 
confirmed is the role of the academy, the role of the feminist scholar and 
the law as the site for change. The position of the individual woman (the 
victim on the factory floor) becomes part of a ‘larger picture’ to be elucidated 
within academic texts of law and, hopefully, thereby productive of 
legal and social change (put that way round). As Badiou says of this form 
of ethics: 
 
. . . ethics prevents itself from thinking the singularity of situations as such, which is the 
obligatory starting point of all properly human action. Thus, for instance, the doctor won 
over to an ‘ethical ideology’ will ponder, in meetings and commissions, all sorts of considerations 
regarding ‘the sick’, conceived of in exactly the same way as the partisan of human 
rights conceives of the indistinct crowd of victims . . . (Badiou, 2002, p. 14). 
 
In effect the individual is not only not able to speak of and for herself, but 
will be subsumed into a generalised collectivity of women/victims who 
require our help as academics and lawyers. They become no more than 
figures we address by offering our services – our scholarship and our law. 
And, as Badiou goes on to say: 
 
. . . the same doctor will have no difficulty in accepting the fact that this particular person 
is not treated at the hospital . . . because he or she is without residency papers . . . What 
is erased in the process is the fact that there is only one medical situation, the clinical 
situation, and there is no need for an ‘ethics’ to understand that a doctor is a doctor only if 
he deals with this situation . . . 
 
The position and skills of a doctor are much more easily translated into a 
division between the generalised ‘ethics’ of medical care and the imperative 
to act so as to give care, but the message is clear: despite seeming 
to see the position of the woman factory worker, we move quickly into a 
scenario in which our ethical responsibility is to speak ‘for’ her rather than 
‘to’ her, and in speaking ‘for her’ we are distanced not merely from her, 
but also from any political responsibility towards her, she is simply part of 
a larger picture. 
It is here that the feminist scholar in law seems to have a double burden 
– she is academic with ethical problems (especially in relation to the apprehension 
of the victim of harm) and she is lawyer (who has the training and 
skills which might be offered to the victim to try and use the law). Within 
the discourse of a feminist legal scholarship, these are understandable 
imperatives: What we find, we should seek to change, at least alleviate. But 
what Badiou is asking us to stand back and think about is how easily this 
slips into patterns of potentially patronising and distanced ‘concern’ which 
more easily becomes the focus of establishing a claim to academic work 
rather than really addressing the circumstances and needs of the woman victim. 
Scholarship requires distance; feminism requires, at a minimum, 
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sympathy with the position of the woman studied. The conflicts between 
the two are frequently examined in literature dealing with social science 
methodology, especially in relation to empirical work. But in this text, 
not addressing social science methodology but rather a more generalised 
account of feminist scholarship in law, the focus is more hazy and the 
figure of the scholar hovers between a social scientist and a lawyer without 
ever having to give a clear account of either. We shift from what might 
have become an account of directly dealing with the woman/client to a 
more generalised account of a grouping which does not require empirical 
research. Thus the woman scholar of law can begin to deal with questions 
of presentation of the needs of a client group in a much less focused way 
and we slip into dealing with questions which owe their origins more to 
the work of philosophy and the humanities than social sciences. 
This slippage between the heritages of social sciences, humanities and 
law, and also what I might call the hangover of the imperative of feminism 
to engage for political purposes which must necessarily be focused on 
change, produces some very muddled accounts of the feminist project 
contained in legal feminism. It is as if the strength of feminist work in 
law is that it attempts to pull all these heritages together; but, it seems to 
me, they not only often pull in different directions but also allow crucial 
slippages when moving from one register of work to another yet presenting 
it all as if it was one practice of scholarship. The picture may begin with 
a focus on woman-as-victim, but it quickly moves into a very different 
discursive form. 
The text recognises that feminists have struggled with a number of the 
issues surrounding the study of ‘woman’. The author alludes principally to 
the “fear of essentialism”, which led to “the partial paralysis of theory and 
practice”: 
 
Anxiety about essentialism has generated excessive caution in the development of theory 
and its application . . . (Naffine, 2002, p. 90). 
 
She cites two major problems for feminist scholarship that arose from “the 
fear of essentialism”. The first: 
 
[A] problem with the concession to the authoritative experience of the person in ‘the box 
seat’ is that the so-called ‘other’ may thus be romanticised, as exotically different and 
perpetually unknowable. In other words, the concerted effort to do justice to the world 
views of those differently situated, by declaring them the final authority on their own 
situation, contains the tacit proposition that their experience is somehow always beyond 
reach, always in some way incommensurable to one’s own experience. This is to fall into 
the trap that some men set for themselves, but perhaps with less goodwill . . . to declare 
women obscure and unknowable . . . (Naffine, 2002, p. 91). 
 
She then goes on to the second problem: 
 
A related problem with the work of the feminist scholar who is concerned not to generalise 
too much beyond her own experience and who wishes to avoid the ‘masculine third person’, 
is that her writing can become highly autobiographical, even solipsistic (ibid.). 
 
Both these problems must be overcome, she argues, in order to achieve 
legal scholarship; they are overcome by realising the need to move into a 
more abstract terrain. If we recognise that: 
 
. . . those having the experience may in fact have a poor critical appreciation of what is 
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going on, not only because they do not have the time and energy to analyse it, but because 
the situation itself addles their perception. Marx referred to this as false consciousness 
(Naffine, 2002, p. 92). 
 
And guard against: 
 
. . . the case that the intellectual gets her subject wrong, precisely because she is too 
divorced form the situation, which is why it is important to recognise the need for 
constructive alliances between researcher and researched. Without such alliances there is 
certainly a danger of reducing the women who are subjects of inquiry once again to rather 
strange scientific objects (Naffine, 2002, p. 92). 
 
Then we have achieved a good standard of, and an ethical balance to, 
our scholarship. But look more closely at the series of assumptions and 
slippages which are being made here. First, experience now takes centre 
stage – because somewhere in this mix, we have come to a point of not 
only being concerned about the position of ‘other’ (woman out there) 
but we also presume to speak for her, and must therefore lay a claim to 
her voice. It is rather like taking the role of advocate without receiving 
instructions. In fact it would be difficult to take instructions from ‘her’ 
because there are too many ‘hers’, many of whom have not yet achieved a 
standard of sufficient consciousness which will allow them to speak with 
any authority (real authenticity) about their own needs or wishes. So we 
have to move up the ladder of abstraction, in order to speak not merely of 
‘them’ but for ‘them’. And we must try to do so, we cannot stand back 
and say this women’s experience is beyond mine and therefore it is not 
for me to speak of it, or I only know myself and therefore can only speak 
for or of myself. In what form of feminist scholarship, derived from what 
disciplinary practices, are these still real issues? They are certainly political 
issues when formulating a campaign, and they are issues for social science 
research which tries to convey the needs/wishes of women premised, at 
least in part, on what ‘they’ perceive to be these needs/wishes. But feminist 
scholarship in law (as opposed to social scientists working on legal issues) 
very rarely attempts to speak in such a way. It is not within our training. 
Feminist scholarship by lawyers is much more likely to come across the 
problem of essentialism when postulating whether a particular law has 
had a particular impact on a particular group and whether a change in the 
law is likely to improve the situation. In other words, it is premised on a 
more distanced account from the very beginning and the problem for legal 
scholars has been defining the group with sufficient recognition of its many 
constituent parts rather than exploring issues of an experiential nature. 
Further, it seems inimical to me that contemporary feminist scholarship 
in law should ever go as far as to try and speak ‘for’ women rather than 
‘of’ the position of some women in relation to a specific aspect of law. 
Why then does the text spend so much time worrying about the impact of 
the “fear of essentialism”? Not, I think, because it has constrained feminist 
scholarship in law (although it has been a problem for campaigners) but 
because what it really being defended here, and needs defending, is the 
ontological category of ‘women’.We have actually moved in the text from 
a concern which seems addressed to issues of feminist method in social 
sciences to an issue which has been fundamental to feminist philosophy: 
Can we hold ‘women’ together in one grouping so as to be able to speak of 
them as a group? And, in this sense, one of the most challenging aspects of 
feminist work has been how we ground that ontological status: could it be 
through a common material base or a common experience of oppression, 
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etc., etc. . . . The social sciences certainly fed into this debate by exploring 
and providing models for the collection of empirical data – but the question 
is essentially one of a philosophical nature. And this resonates in this text, 
as in so many others, in a concern ‘with theory’ but without an examination 
of the philosophical base of the use and construction of theory. So, 
we slip from a social sciences model of ‘practice’ to a discourse derived 
from a different register, for a discussion of ‘theory’. And within this text, 
theory is mobilised to rescue us from the problems of essentialism, just 
as it requires that we are so rescued in order for us to mobilise theory as 
scholars. 
The fear of essentialism was such that, 
 
Caution was required at all times and so it seemed that grand theory was off the agenda 




One might further observe that there is an obligation on the intellectual to advance large 
arguments and grand theories, which necessarily ride roughshod over the details of human 
difference, because they are provocative and often deliberately so (Naffine, 2002, p. 92). 
 
Theory is privileged, and seemingly both necessarily “grand” and 
distanced from “the details of human difference”. We move into a terrain 
in which it is ‘theory’ which is presumed to be productive, but then slip 
back into that old problematic of the problem between theory and practice 
and a reminder that, for all the practice of theory, we are still lawyers. The 
author notes in a footnote that: 
 
Admittedly, it is difficult to marry high-level theory with specific law reforms. The heroic 
endeavours of both Drucilla Cornell and Luce Irigaray have met with limited success 
(Naffine, 2002, p. 94). 
 
Is anyone surprised that the work of ‘high level theorists’ should have met 
with limited success in terms of specific law reforms? Do we really hold 
this as part of the measure of the value of their work? And if we too are to 
work ‘in theory’, is it to be a measure of ours? 
Two constructs are evident here – first a presumption that somehow 
we must work through a theory/practice relationship in a model which 
both satisfies the imperatives of our feminism and also the imperatives of 
the work of theorists in the academy and that second, theory comes first. 
The implication is that failure with law reform is due, in part at least, to a 
failure to yet provide sufficient theory. What model for theoretical work is 
employed in this text? 
In a section on ‘the partial paralysis of theory and practice’, following 
the section on being overconstrained by a concern with the fear of 
essentialism in relation to experience, we read in the text that: 
. . . it is . . . rather foolish . . . for scholars who are by profession dedicated to the acquisition 
of knowledge second hand, that is through the writing of others. Necessarily we must be 
able to speak beyond our direct experiences, indeed, to recognise the limitations and distortions 
of those direct experiences, and to enlarge our understanding and to stand corrected. 
Indeed, this is the dialectical method of which I first spoke and which has really been more 
typical of feminism (Naffine, 2002, p. 92). 
 
THE ORTHODOXY OF LEGAL FEMINISM 
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In the text it is argued that although “feminists have convincingly demonstrated 
law’s failure to make sense of many aspects of women’s lives . . . 
legal institutions have remained remarkably resistant to feminism and its 
findings . . . the movement into law had not brought about a paradigm shift 
in legal thought” (Naffine, 2002, pp. 72–73). But what has feminist scholarship, 
especially that represented as legal feminism, exposed or offered 
which might make a “paradigm shift” an appropriate response? 
The method chosen by many feminists could be called explicitly 
dialectical. Feminist legal theory has proceeded often by way of a series 
of tentative theses, to which other feminists (and other theorists) have 
posed antitheses, which have then resolved into tentative syntheses – which 
have provided the starting point for fresh theses . . . It is now common for 
feminists reviewing the achievements of their peers to observe the waves 
of thought which have flowed out of feminism – from liberal feminism to 
radical feminism, from cultural feminism to post-modern feminism – and 
so to acknowledge the developmental nature of their knowledge. They are 
likely to concede the continuing influence and benefits of each of these 
schools of thought (Naffine, 2002, p. 80). 
So the basic methodology employed by feminism is dialectical. I have 
to say that I think the author is right in terms of much of the overtly 
theoretical work, but that, unlike her, I view this as a problem not only for 
feminists, but for all critical scholars. In the text, it is not only introduced 
as the model we can use to describe feminist method but, by implication, 
it is a good, if not the only, way to proceed. Dialectical argumentation 
is only explained not itself examined, just as no alternatives are alluded 
to. Effectively this sutures feminist scholarship to Hegelian dialectics, 
willingly embraced without question. And what are the consequences? A 
presumption that difference is the productive element of synthesis: duality 
is found to enable the overcoming of it. This is the motor that allows us to 
‘make progress’, looking back on ‘the developmental nature of their (our) 
knowledge’. In simple common sense terms, of course one can see it that 
way. But, I would argue that this view of scholarship (that is the production 
of knowledge) is very conservative, very lineal and very predicated on 
feminism being no more than a supplement to the dominant orthodoxies. 
As we track our way through the ‘waves’ of feminist scholarship,11 indeed 
now ‘schools of thought’, we see clearly that this method is not founded in 
feminist scholarship but predicated on the patterns of thinking at the time. 
This is not merely about how feminists produce thinking, but about how 
the academy works. What possible paradigm shift can then be evoked? It 
can only continue as a dialectical relationship, not so much as between 
feminists but between feminists and the academy, with the emphasis on 
the incorporative moment of synthesis. The model of Hegelian dialectics 
still provides the dominant form for thinking difference and the development 
of scholarship within the academy – but alternatives are being, have 
been, explored. If feminism becomes too closely sutured to one method, 
one form, then its continued existence may become predicated within this 
form. Just as previously some critics found feminism too implicated with 
liberalism and emancipatory politics to provide a focus for more critical 
work, so in the future it may be claimed that feminism is too implicated 
with Hegelian models to survive any philosophy developed beyond them. 
What is never questioned is the fundamental dialectical methodology 
expressed both as ‘feminist method’ and as the form of engagement with 
theory. Let me suggest two aspects to this which the author herself recognises 
as problematic but manages to overcome in order to hold the whole 
edifice together. First, the figure which I have already examined – woman 
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as victim as the focus of our work. The presumption is that we must hold 
together this figure otherwise we lose our claim to speak not merely ‘of’ 
her but ‘for’ her. In dialectical terms, without this figure we have nothing to 
offer of countervailing force to the existing, partial, paradigm of scholarship. 
We could not present ourselves as feminist scholars without an object 
of study as well as a method by which we study that object. In order to keep 
it in play we must, despite the problems of essentialism and subjectivity, 
move to a sufficiently abstract level of engagement. This always marks 
the dialectical method – shifting through levels of abstraction until we can 
reach a point which is recognisable within the terrain we seek to engage. 
Hence we must necessarily move to ‘grand theory’ in order to engage with 
grand theory dialectically. This, of course, presumes that this is the only 
form of scholastic engagement. Leaving aside the possibility that there are 
other forms of scholastic engagement, what we need to examine are the 
limitations of this form of engagement (which is to accept that it can be 
productive but to argue that we must also consider its limits). 
All the time, what resonates throughout this approach is that ‘the 
subject’ is woman-out-there who we acknowledge as the subject for us (as 
feminist scholars) to study and to whom we offer, we hope, legal reform, 
but necessarily delivered through ‘grand theory’ and that meanwhile, what 
we are much more certain about is that we offer to legal scholars, our 
insights into this ‘subject’, and we can therefore lay claim to a proper place 
within the academy as women, and as feminist intellectuals. Indeed it is the 
woman-out-there, our raison d’etre as feminists, to whom we offer up the 
academy along with our feminism. 
Badiou’s critique is aimed specifically at the construction of an ethics 
based on the apprehension of ‘the other’. It is obvious that I have moved 
his critique and put it to the purpose of an entirely different project – I 
have used it to tease out the implications of presenting an ‘other’ in the 
guise of victim as the basis for the presentation of feminist work within 
the academy. Leaving aside for the moment whether this move on my 
part is theoretically valid, there are two points I want to make. The first 
is the lack of focus on the feminist scholar herself: She is not an object 
of study and the particular construction of knowledge in which she is 
participating is not in doubt. I do think that part of the problem is an uneasy 
inheritance of law/sociology/philosophy which is not examined and is very 
common to feminist work. But there is also something else which needs to 
be examined here – it is a presumption that without the figure of woman, 
the feminist project as ‘legal feminism’ will unravel. And further that the 
figure of woman which we require is the figure of victim needing our help. 
Although there is some recognition that using this figure involves some 
difficult moments, it is still our task to find a way to keep her as our focus of 
work. In the end the success of this focus is our ability to keep on working 
in this way – rather than asking what we have delivered, can deliver, for 
her. I think that this is analogous to the issues which Badiou is highlighting 
in his own concerns – but his move is then to find another way to ground 
ethics and it is at this point that I am no longer interested in using his work 
(not anyway for purposes here). Therefore, to return to questioning the 
strength of using his work at all in the way that I have, it has been simply 
to recognise, by analogy, that constructing a figure in a particular way may 
well carry certain consequences and open two questions: Is it necessary 
and are their alternatives? I want to go back to how the figure is used in the 
broader thrust of an argument for ‘legal feminism’. 
My argument within the context of this text is that feminist scholarship 
is presented as capable of synthesis within the prevailing model of 
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academic work. At one level it is – but is this all that it is capable of 
and what does it do to feminist work to construct it is this way? With 
a focus so sharply placed on praising the potential of the synthesis of 
‘legal feminism’ as a scholastic enterprise, the paradox is that those very 
aspects that are presented as problematic within the text, will have to be 
continually revisited. Not only because they are not within the terms used, 
cannot be, answered in any decisive way, but because they will, in some 
aspect, be required in order to keep open a ‘feminist’ supplement within 
the scholastic community. If feminism remains predicated on presenting 
‘the female subject’, the problem of essentialism12 will always be there to 
be answered, but it will always be there. If feminism is to be presented 
as requiring a normative base within this form of theoretical work, then 
the ‘ethics of difference’ will still be played through in one of its many 
variations. And there will always be an attempt to incorporate difference 
by finding a level abstract enough in law and in scholarship to enable 
the established order to be confirmed by offering the promise of our own 
privileges. ‘Grand theory’ may not be too good on delivering law reform, 
but we can retreat to the use of legal discourse to find a way forward: 
The lawyer’s overt commitment to justice further strengthens the position of the feminist. 
For she can invoke law’s own objectives and stated intentions which are to do right by 
everyone; to be fair and impartial (Naffine, 2002, p. 78). 
Just as we can appeal to “open scholarly debate”. But why should any 
“paradigm shift” be expected from any of this? The project is inherently 
conservative, not only because what is lost to view is any reference at all to 
politics and power, but also because, despite a claim to theory, it is theory 




Tying in feminism to the dominant existing theoretical paradigm means 
quite straightforwardly presenting feminism as constituted by and within 
a Hegelian dialectic. In so doing, the constraints of dialectical thinking 
are not examined and what we stand to lose is the potentials for feminist 
thought through and in relation to radical rethinking beyond the Hegelian 
project emerging in philosophical work, seen, for instance, in the work of 
Badiou and Deleuze. I firmly believe that it is in this work that we will 
find much to revitalise and move forward feminism and that it is through 
engaging with this material that we will enable conversations with new 
generations of scholars. If, however, we let ‘feminism’ in the academy 
become dominated by the ‘legal feminism’ approach, the consequence will 
be a closure to the new, a stagnation, a sedimentation into a past which can 
produce only a limited agenda for the future – for feminists, for radical 
scholars and for the potential for work between them. 
Is There a Minimum Content to Feminism? 
Both Badiou and Deleuze address two projects: One is a concern to move 
beyond what they both argue are the outmoded constraints of Hegelian 
dialectical thinking, and the second in a concern to find and commit to 
an ethical practice (and hence new forms of political engagement) against 
the prevailing orthodoxies of post-modernism, either in it’s presentation 
as beyond ethics or in the defense of an ethics derived from a Levinasian 
dialectic. 
In Praise of Legal Feminism addresses, in common with many contemporary 
feminist texts (for example, Conaghan, 2000), the problems 
which many feminists encountered when faced with the allure of postmodernism. 
The text focuses on two issues which were indeed the major 
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foci of concern to feminists: the “death of the (female) subject” and the 
“fear of essentialism”. The working presumption (again in common with 
the majority of feminist work) is that these problems have had to be 
accommodated or overcome, in order for feminist scholarship to continue. 
I would suggest that this is presuming that feminism needs to achieve a 
certain ontological status in order for ‘it’ to exist as a category.Without that 
status ‘it’ could not take a place, find a place, within the academy. ‘It’ could 
not enter into a dialectical relationship with other ‘schools of scholarship’ 
as an equivalent partner. ‘It’ certainly could not achieve a discipline status 
in its own right, if that was what was sought. 
We took seriously the announcement of our death, so seriously that we 
spent a great deal of time proving that we were still alive and kicking. But 
how was our survival achieved? By moving backwards, not forwards. By 
reasserting that we had an identity and a place, constituted in and by the 
dominant orthodoxies before post-modernism really disrupted everybody’s 
lives. By not letting go of an identity which, in the case of feminist scholars 
of law, tried to find a model which could bring into relation theory with 
practice, and work derived from a sociological base with work derived 
from a philosophical base, into a form of feminist legal scholarship which 
now asserts an arrival as ‘legal feminism’. However unstable and fraught 
and difficult to hold together, in the face of everything being challenged, it 
seemed that feminist scholarship could not survive unless somehow it held 
on to this. Indeed, found ways of affirming it. 
But it is not merely feminism which seeks normative and ontological 
patterns, these are the very patterns required within an Hegelian model – 
synthesis is about progression, progression towards a better future. If we 
are to engage with scholarship within these terms, then they not merely 
resonate with feminist inclinations, they require them and amplify them. 
My argument is that we do not need to limit ourselves to a presumption 
that feminism can only survive if it conforms to the patterns of an identity 
with category status. Two aspects are important here. First, that some of 
the challenges of post-modernism are important challenges to thinking 
which should not be resisted only by returning to ‘old’ models, but may 
be useful ‘shocks to thought’13 which do lead us to seek out, create, new 
paradigms for knowledge(s). In so doing, when we turn to encounter the 
challenges to post-modern thinking coming from ‘new’ philosophy, we 
should be willing to test and rethink presumptions we have made about 
feminism and be willing to think that feminism may be constituted in ways 
which do not rely on what we have assumed we need, but may be vibrant in 
quite a different form. In Deleuzean terms, if we think more of feminism 
as a force, a movement of potentials, rather than an identity, we may be 
opening potentials which may seem initially strange, destabilising and 
disorientating but do not necessarily mean that we are ‘lost’, just radically 
changed and transformed. 
But is there, then, a kind of minimum content to a thing we can call 
feminism? I think that although these are not the terms which really need 
to be addressed or indeed the way in which such a question should be 
asked, there are clear indices which help us to define what we mean by 
the term. Moreover, by addressing the issue in this way I can try and 
open up a space for dialogue between those working within the traditional 
orthodoxies and those of us who are committed to challenging those orthodoxies 
and therefore, for some, challenging the emerging orthodoxy as 
exemplified in the text of ‘legal feminism’. Three indices seem to me to be 
irreducible minimums. The first is that we have so many clear examples of 
the continuation of power structures which overtly work against women. 
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The second is that so much of what we do now is necessarily strategic and 
contingent. (Deleuze explicitly recognises that women in their struggle as 
women require, at present, a ‘subjectivity’. He recognises that need for 
now, and implicit in that recognition is a presumption that in using that 
‘subjectivity’, we do not need to confine ourselves to it by limiting our 
potentials for futures beyond the need for it. The question is how we do 
it, why we do it and with what level of recognition of it as a device do we 
bring to our use of it.15) The third is our commitment to change, a refusal 
to accept the circumstances which continue to operate against women. 
These could be thought of as an irreducible minimum, but it could 
equally be thought of as aspects which constitute a force, an imperative, 
and a field of activity within which we pursue our many divergent interests 
and needs, held together, loosely, by our common recognition of ourselves 
as challengers of the status quo, and a commitment to try and hear clearly 
the many voices within the field and enter into many conversations with 
them/us. Through this field, paths and energies cross and recross with 
differing intensities and differing impacts on others. It is fluid and what 
is important is to do everything we can to keep movement open. This is a 
much more Deleuzean model of the practice of theory. 
Deleuze recognises, activates, difference but not within a dialectical 
framework – his work reaches towards a model, an understanding, which 
keeps open and productive difference(s), therefore synthesis is something 
which he wishes to avoid. Contingent claims and alliances may be made 
for good strategic political reasons, but there is no striving towards a state 
of final balance, final inclusiveness. Instead he offers a series of experiments, 
both for thought and for political practice, within the frame of 
an ethical commitment to seeking ways to expose, challenge and change 
the dominant oppressions of society today, constituted in the many forms 
by which power asserts and reproduces itself. His method is both grand 
and modest at the same time. Grand in that he seeks fundamentally to 
disrupt patterns of thinking which we have taken for granted, modest in 
that he asserts that small challenges are significant. It is not a matter of 
waiting for grand theory to present an agenda, it is rather that we should 
continually be struggling to create change in thought and at the very same 
time be politically engaged. Within this model theory/practice is not an 
issue in terms of which one comes first, because both are being continually 
(re)negotiated. The subject is not an issue and we do not need to fear 
essentialism – because we do not need to believe in some transcendental 
sense in the first, and we do need to lay claim to speaking for all or trying to 
find a theory/politics for all, at once in one form in the second. What using 
this model does require of us is a willingness to let go of a presumption 
that either norms or ontology will be found in theory itself. Rather, norms 
and the possibility of change for the better are to be found in the practice 
of theory, the reasons why we engage with it and the many ways it may 
be productive in its use. It does mean letting go of a presumption that 
it is ‘theory’ in some grand sense which will, one day, provide us with 
complete answers and an agenda for change. It also means that, however 
attractive it might seem to present ourselves as a unity constituted within 
an identity of ‘legal feminism’, we must recognise that this limits the 
potential of our work. It may help to lay a claim to a place within the 
academy, but it does so by suturing ourselves to dominant orthodoxies. 
It may also seem attractive because it offers a seeming coherence which 
will help place and give direction to our work in a very immediate way.16 
I hope that I have given some indication here that the cost of this is the 
heroic effort required to present ourselves in such a way, to keep the figure 
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stable, and the consequences of this for our scholarship and political work 
as feminists. Trying to hold everything together within a more and more 
abstract theoretical model, is only one way of thinking a future for feminist 
scholarship and it is one which is more predicated on past practices rather 
than looking to a future of alternatives. Ironically, I believe, that a model 
which breaks with the Hegelian past, leaving behind what seems to be an 
assured future for feminism as a distinct entity, will be more productive 
for feminist scholarship. That which seems to most threaten the feminist 
project, will, I believe, offer a much more productive series of engagements 
for feminists as scholars and as political activists. The emergence of a 
prevailing orthodoxy sutured to Hegelian dialectics, should be seen for 
what it is, one form of engagement but not the only one. An alternative 
will be more difficult to deliver, but to seek it should end the search for ‘a 
theory’, which will speak to and for all feminists and concentrate instead, 
on constructing patterns of engagement which are both more modest in 
their nature and far more radical in their purpose. The final irony is that 
I think that this describes with far more accuracy than the text of legal 
feminism, the pluralistic nature of current feminist scholarship and political 
engagement. Finding a different way of thinking and using theory may 
well then be both more representative of, as well as more conducive to, the 
full potential of feminist scholarship. 
 
FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP IN LAW RATHER THAN LEGAL FEMINISM 
 
My concern with the emergence of an orthodoxy which I have come to 
associate with the term ‘legal feminism’ is that by turning towards a particular 
theoretical mode of engagement – dialectical – it requires that work 
proceeds in a way which begins with difference but focuses on the promise 
of synthesis. The synthesis sought is within the academy at the level of 
presenting a theorised body of knowledge. Difference is presumed to be 
a dialectics of difference. In order to enter into this dialectical relation, 
a coherent ‘school of thought’ needs to be established. This is done by 
presenting the figure of woman, the basic feminist concern, then holding 
that figure together within a particular formulation of woman-as-victim 
within a framework of law and law reform. This figure must be kept stable 
as the object of study in order for the feminist scholar and lawyer to 
proceed within the twin objects of both studying her and offering her help. 
Anything which threatens to destabilise the figure needs to be resisted 
where the usual strategy for resistance is to move to a higher plane of 
abstract thought and to mobilise the needs of the actual woman-as-victim 
as still requiring our help which can only be achieved by holding the figure 
together and finding sufficient theory to provide coherent strategies for law 
reform. Within this formulation we seek a theoretical model which will 
provide us with a sufficient normative base and a pattern of scholarship 
which suggests progressive movement. Better theory will make for better 
law reform to meet the needs of women/woman-as-victim. 
This model is certainly aspirational – but can it deliver the promise of 
more than being recognised as a school of thought within the academy? I 
believe that there is little to encourage us in the idea that ‘grand theory’ 
of the Hegelian type will produce models for law reform. Indeed such 
a pursuit of theory is more likely to end up as simply that, a pursuit of 
theory. And in pursing such theory as feminists, we will continue to make 
presumptions of an ethical and ontological nature which we do not necessarily 
need to make when we turn to thinking about thinking and practicing 
theory. Different types of theoretical engagement might not seem to be 
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immediately addressed to feminist concerns and traditions but might well 
serve us in ways which we do not at this point anticipate. 
Let me suggest that using the term ‘feminist scholarship on law’, a 
much looser formulation than legal feminism, might connote a much 
broader range of scholarship undertaken by feminists as feminists but 
not addressed to, defined by, or limited by the orthodoxy presumed in 
legal feminism. There is a role for theoretical work which breaks with 
the Hegelian dialectic, even, to the extent of letting go of ‘women’ as a 
category and ‘subjectivity’ as a necessary rather than a convenient, strategic 
tool. There is a role for theoretical work which does not in any 
immediate sense deliver reform agendas. There is also a role for feminist 
work which struggles with immediate engagement with law and issues of 
reform, not only because it is so necessary not to stand aside but because it 
is where we tease out so much of our thinking. Such struggles may neither 
derive their impetus from theoretical work nor feed directly into theoretical 
work of an abstract nature. It is not a question of applying theory but rather 
of finding our needs for theoretical engagements through localised, small 
incursions into issues of law. I have frequently heard voiced recently a 
concern with how little law has actually delivered in terms of reform or 
the impact of reform: but what did we expect? That it would be easy? 
That it would be transformative? Neither ‘law’ not ‘theory’ will deliver 
grand plans for great change – the point is to keep on struggling to open 
issues, keep them open and to keep on seeking and questioning possibilities 
and potentials. This is not a slip into relativism nor a retreat into 
reformism – it is to recognise that our aspirations as feminists have not 
changed but that our methods, means and incursions into the practice of 
theory (and of law) have to be modest within the context of a firm commit- 
ment to challenge and to change. Within these terms, a Deleuzean model 
of theory, of thinking about thinking as the practice of theory, has much 
more to offer feminists, I believe, than the dialectical model presented in 
‘legal feminism’ and would open us to a much more inclusive, interactive 
and productive account of the potentials, the productive pluralities, within 
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